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DARFUR: A VERY INCONVENIENT
DEVELOPMENT
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In March of 2004, at the very height of the most violent phase of the Darfur
genocide, Mukesh Kapila approached the end of his yearlong tenure as UN Humanitarian
Coordinator for Sudan, and used the occasion to make a series of extraordinary and
institutionally unconstrained comments:
“The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved.
[The slaughter in Darfur] is more than just a conflict, it is an organised attempt to do
away with a group of people. I was present in Rwanda at the time of the genocide, and
I've seen many other situations around the world, and I am totally shocked at what is
going on in Darfur.”
Despite transparently mendacious claims by the National Islamic Front regime in
Khartoum in early February 2004 that it had brought the situation in Darfur under “total
military control,” Kapila insisted, for all who would listen:
“The pattern of organised attacks on civilians and villages, abductions, killings and
organised rapes by militias is getting worse by the day and could deteriorate even further.
'One can see how the situation might develop without prompt [action]...all the warning
signs are there.’”
Of course there has been no “prompt action,” and Kapila’s ominous premonition
about “might develop” has come fully to pass.
What is less widely known than these frequently cited remarks is that behind the
scenes, Kapila had been carrying the same message to senior UN and UK officials for
months. He went public with his assessment because he no longer had to fear for his job,
and because despite his urgent warnings, the UN was not responding. But we know from
Kapila’s testimony before a British Parliamentary committee, and comments cited earlier
this month in the Times of London, what he had been saying for months prior to March
2004—and how his warnings were received:
“There was a fundamental feeling among very senior people that Darfur was a very
inconvenient development and they would rather not know about it.”
What we are seeing today in Darfur is too much a product of this feeling that
genocide in a remote, arid, impoverished, and geopolitically inconsequential region of
Africa was simply “inconvenient.” Rather than confront the difficult challenges in
halting vast, ethnically-targeted human destruction, all international actors of
consequence settled for political and diplomatic half- measures, or merely symbolic
measures—and too often allowed, for convenience’s sake, the crisis to be defined as
essentially humanitarian in nature, with an overlay of unfortunate tribal conflicts
animated by competition for diminishing natural resources. This gross misrepresentation
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of the catastrophe still finds an audience in many quarters, as the desire to ignore the
urgency of Darfur’s crisis overwhelms the need to look honestly at what is happening.
But let us for the moment ignore the disingenuous chattering that seems a specialty
of the British left and ask seriously about the consequences of continued inaction on
Darfur. There is no better point of departure than Jan Egeland’s concluding remarks in
his August 28th briefing of the UN Security Council:
“In the past months I have repeatedly called for attention to the deteriorating
situation in Darfur. As you have heard today our warnings have become a black reality
[calling] for immediate action: insecurity is at its highest levels since 2004; access at its
lowest levels since that date; and we may well be on the brink of a retur n to all-out war.
This would mean the withdrawal of international staff from Darfur, leaving millions of
vulnerable Darfuris to suffer their fate without assistance and with few outsiders to
witness.
[The humanitarian gains of the past two years in Darfur] can all be lost within
weeks---not months. I cannot give a starker warning than to say that we are at a point
where even hope may escape us and the lives of hundreds of thousands could be
needlessly lost.”
Six weeks later, there is still no significant “action” of the sort the UN
Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs called for. Passage of UN Security
Council Resolution 1706 (August 31st ), under Chapter VII authority of the UN Charter,
has meant nothing, despite the robust force outlined: 22,500 troops and security
personnel, with a clear mandate for civilian and humanitarian protection. Notably,
Resolution 1706 also provides for monitoring of Sudan’s borders with Chad and the
Central African Republic—neighboring countries into which Darfur’s ge nocidal
destruction has already bled in ghastly and highly destabilizing fashion, with most of the
responsibility clearly falling to the Khartoum regime. I would call your particular
attention to the reportage from the Central African Republic by Nicholas Kristof of the
New York Times earlier this month.
There is an irreducible truth in the present historic moment, however inconvenient
it remains: the UN force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1706 could save
hundreds of thousands of innocent lives if rapidly deployed with adequate resources for
military and security personnel. This force has been blocked by the same handful of
National Islamic Front genocidaires in Khartoum that have for three and a half years
relentlessly, systematically, and savagely targeted the non-Arab or African tribal
populations of Darfur as a means of crushing the insurgency that emerged in February
2003. The ethnically- targeted nature of this well-orchestrated destruction has been
extensively documented in numerous human rights reports, UN assessment missions, and
by a wide range of journalists and humanitarian workers.
To be sure, the nature of conflict and genocidal destruction in Darfur has changed
significantly since the extraordinary levels of violence in 2003-2004, which saw 80-90%
of all African villages in Darfur destroyed (this is the consensus range among my many
contacts in the Darfuri diaspora). But what must not be forgotten is how
comprehensively destructive village assaults typically were, including the demolishing or
poisoning of precious water wells and irrigation systems ; destroying food- and seedstocks, as well as agricultural implements and water vessels; cutting down mature fruit
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trees; and the looting or killing of livestock, often representing generations of family
wealth.
Such deliberately destructive violence, along with mass executions, the systematic
and racialized use of rape as a weapon of war, torture, abduction, and other forms of
violent abuse have produced the staggering numbers of deaths, displaced persons, and
civilians who are now critically in need of humanitarian aid. It may be that people die
now not so much from violent attacks—though these are again accelerating very
dramatically—as from the disease and malnutrition and despair that have come in their
ghastly wake. But the 1948 Genocide Convention makes clear that these deaths are no
less genocidal in nature: the deliberate, ethnically- targeted destruction of livelihoods and
the ability to live is also genocide.
What are the present obstacles to deployment of an appropriate international force
to protect Darfuri civilians? Why is it that the emerging legal norm of a “responsibility to
protect” precisely such radically endangered populations has been so abjectly abandoned,
despite its prominent place in the UN World Summit “outcome document” of September
2005, specifically paragraph 139? How can it be so inconsequential for Darfur that in
April 2006 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1674? This
resolution exp licitly “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World
Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”
Answers to these questions tell us much about how the history of the Darfur
genocide will be written in the coming years—a history that will lack for neither detail,
nor precise chronology, nor the clearest possible evidence of individual, institutional, and
governmental responsibility. Certainly there has never in the history of genocide been
such a fully documented episode of sustained, systematic, deliberate destruction of
human beings on an ethnic basis—and this will inevitably be the most salient fact in the
history that must be written.
The first and most essential part of any answer lies in the nature of the brutal
security cabal that rules in Khartoum, and continues to be accepted as a legitimate
government—indeed is dutifully referred to by the UN and other international actors as
Sudan’s “Government of National Unity.” But the National Islamic Front, which has
innocuously and expediently renamed itself the National Congress Party, completely
dominates the merely notional “Government of National Unity” and represents neither
the people of southern Sudan, nor the people of Darfur, nor indeed any of Sudan’s
marginalized populations. The most senior political figures of the southern Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement(SPLM)—essentially the Government of South Sudan—
have repeatedly and explicitly called for deployment of the UN force. So too have all
factions of the badly divided Sudan Liberation Movement, including Minni Minawi, who
signed the ill-conceived and ill- fated “Darfur Peace Agreement” negotiated in Abuja,
Nigeria last spring. Minawi is nominally the fourth-ranking member of the Presidency in
the “Government of National Unity,” and SPLM’s Salva Kiir is First Vice-President—
both are completely irrelevant.
Largely ignored in current deferential negotiations with the National Islamic Front,
most prominently with President Omar al-Bashir, is the history of this ruthlessly
survivalist regime, which came to power by military coup in June of 1989, deposing an
elected government, and deliberately aborting Sudan’s most promising chance to
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negotiate a north/south peace since independence in 1956. In its 17 years in power, the
National Islamic Front has repeatedly had recourse to genocidal destruction as a domestic
security policy. As seasoned Sudan observer Alex de Waal has written of the actions of
this regime in Darfur:
“This is not the genocidal campaign of a government at the height of its ideological
hubris, as the 1992 jihad against the Nuba Mountains was, or coldly determined to secure
natural resources, as when it sought to clear the oilfields of southern Sudan of their
troublesome inhabitants. This is the routine cruelty of a security cabal, its humanity
withered by years in power: it is genocide by force of habit.”
[De Waal and Julie Flint have given us what is certainly our best account of the
origins of the Darfur conflict: Darfur: A Short History of a Long War.]
How is it that the international community has conferred upon these long-term
genocidaires the right to veto UN deployment of a force to curtail ongoing genocidal
destruction? How is it that Jan Pronk, the Secretary General’s special representative for
Sudan, two weeks ago simply capitulated to Khartoum’s obdurate refusal to countenance
the UN force authorized by the Security Council? On what basis—other than craven
political expediency—did Pronk accept that the present African Union mission in Darfur
would continue as the only source of security for over 4 million civilians in a
humanitarian theater now much larger than France (if we include eastern Chad)—a
population increasingly dependent upon humanitarian operations that are rapidly
collapsing?
A month ago Jan Egeland described these operations as in “free fall.” In the
intervening weeks I’ve received numerous, increasingly desperate communications from
humanitarian workers in the field—extraordinarily courageous people who feel as
abandoned as the civilians of Darfur, and only marginally less endangered. Huge areas of
Darfur are either totally inaccessible or only tenuously accessible; and the areas of
inaccessibility grow steadily greater as Khartoum’s current military offensive in North
and West Darfur expands, with ongoing indiscriminate aerial bombardment of villages
and civilian targets.
Who is most responsible for current international inaction? Russia and China have
done most to insulate Khartoum from greater pressure by the Security Council; but the
US and Europe have failed to convince these two veto-wielding members that Darfur
matters enough—have failed to expend the necessary diplomatic and political capital to
make Darfur a truly first-tier international issue. The Arab League has gone through the
motions of encouraging Khartoum to accept a UN force, but has made clear that it will
not support UN deployment unless Khartoum consents. And the African Union, which
months ago made clear its inability to continue in Darfur, has also declared that, despite
its radical shortcomings, it will not support UN deployment without Khartoum’s consent.
A complete lack of political and moral courage on the part of Kofi Annan largely
completes the picture of international impotence.
Such impotence is all the reassurance the regime has needed to remain intransigent.
Egeland’s grim prediction of hundreds of thousands of Darfuri civilians dying
needlessly is even now being realized. Given the present level of mortality—I believe,
on the basis of all extant evidence, approximately half a million human beings—the
overall death toll could exceed 1 million following the “hunger gap” of next summer. It
is impossible for me to believe that fewer than 10,000 people are dying every month,
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given the reports I am receiving from the ground and humanitarian officials speaking
confidentially.
¶27
While the political reality is clear—the UN has no political will to make “the
responsibility to protect” a reality in Darfur—so too is the moral reality: we have seen, on
the basis of evidence that incinerates any possible agnosticism, genocide proceed for
three and a half years and have refused to do what is necessary to halt the ultimate human
crime. This is the world as we find it.
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